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Alan Randall, John P. Hoehn, and David S. Brookshire**

Contingent Valuation Surveys for

Evaluating Environmental Assets*
INTRODUCTION
At least since David Hume,' economists and other social scientists
have recognized that the simple voluntary process of the market place
cannot provide some kinds of goods and amenities in efficient quantities.
Where goods are non-exclusive, so that one's use is unrelated to one's
contribution toward provision, individuals have the opportunity to act as
free-riders. For nonrival goods, i.e., goods where one individual's consumption does not effectively reduce the amount available for another's
consumption, ordinary exclusion is insufficient to permit efficient allocation through voluntary exchange. 2 For Pareto-efficiency, a more demanding form of exclusion becomes essential, so that people who do not
pay an amount equal to their own personal valuation are excluded.
Samuelson3 and Bradford4 established the necessary and sufficient conditions for collective provision of the efficient quantity of a nonrival good.
Conceptual work by Maler 5 Randall and Stoll,6 and Small and Rosen 7
established Hicksian value measures for changes in the quantity and
quality of goods (including the non-exclusive, indivisible or lumpy, and/
or nonrival). Thus, potential Pareto-improvements become identifiable,
*This paper (83-1-32) is published with the approval of the Director of the Kentucky Agricultural
Experiment Station. Several organizations have supported the research leading to this paper. In
particular, the Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, has
been a frequent sponsor, and Alan Carlin of that office has provided consistent support and encouragement.
**Randall and Hoehn are with the University of Kentucky, and Brookshire is currently visiting
at the U.S. Geological Survey on leave from the University of Wyoming. Considerable developmental
work in contingent valuation has been performed by groups of researchers at Wyoming and Kentucky,
sometimes working together in formal contractual arrangements but more often working independently while maintaining informal communications. This mix of independent and shared research
experiences has led to a substantial convergence of professional judgment among the authors of this
paper. Nevertheless, there are a few remaining differences of interpretation; for example, see footnote
50.
1. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739).
2. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV. ECON. STAT. 387 (1954).
3. Id.
4. Bradford, Benefit Cost Analysis and The Demandfor Public Goods, 23 KYKLOS 775 (1970).
5. K.-G. MALER, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (1974).
6. Randall & Stoll, Consumers Surplus in Commodity Space, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 449 (1980).
7. Small & Rosen, Applied Welfare Analysis with DiscreteChoice Models, 49 ECONOMETRICA
105 (1981).
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and benefit cost (BC) analysis of programs to change the level of environmental amenities may be undertaken.
The most direct method of BC analysis for these kinds of goods requires
that individuals reveal their personal valuations to the analyst. Briefly,
this method has the advantages of analytical simplicity and broad applicability, but, in so far as stated personal valuations evade interpersonal
validation, some economists remain suspicious that misstated valuations
may be prevalent. This paper addresses the various contingent valuation
procedures which employ this method of analysis. Before critically evaluating these procedures, the paper briefly considers the alternative methods available.
Based on a conceptual framework expounded by, for example, Maler,
Rosen 9 and Freeman, 10 economists have developed techniques that use
observations in the markets for related goods to estimate the value of
unpriced amenities. Value data emerge from real transactions, and hence
they enjoy a presumption of validity. Nevertheless, these techniques also
suffer disadvantages. Its range of applicability is limited to amenities for
which related-goods-markets convey adequate information, and is restricted to the experienced range of provision levels. Such analyses often
invoke simplifying assumptions (e.g., weak complementarity, and identical preferences). These assumptions may introduce inaccuracies into the
analysis and therefore provoke criticism of the methods."1 In addition,
ex ante evaluation of complex, multi-faceted policy initiatives, while not
theoretically impossible, requires satisfaction of a demanding set of aggregation conditions.'2
The realization that the best-known alternative methods are themselves
subject to limitations and criticisms is essential to a balanced evaluation
of contingent valuation methods. The comparison is not between contingent valuation and a perfect alternative. Rather, it is among techniques
which are all imperfect, but in different ways.
8. Supra, note 5.
9. Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets:Product Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82
J. POL. ECON. 34 (1974).
10. Freeman, Approaches to Measuring Public Goods Demands, 61 AM. J. ECON. 915 (1979),
and THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT (1979).
11. See, for example, Maler, A Note on the Use of Property Values in Estimating Marginal
Willingness to Pay for Environmental Quality, 4 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 355 (1977).
Other related criticisms of demand based estimation methods (e.g., hedonic price analysis) include
those in N. E. Bockstael & K. E. McConnell, Welfare Measurement in the Household Production
Framework (1982) (unpublished manuscript); Brown & Rosen, On the Estimation of Structural
Hedonic PriceModels, (forthcoming in ECONOMETRICA); and R. Mendelsohn, The Demand and
Supply for Characteristicsof Goods (1980) (unpublished manuscript).
12. J. P. Hoehn and A. Randall, Aggregation and Disaggregationof Program Benefits in a
Complex Policy Environment, presented at the annual meeting of the Am. Agric. Econ. Assoc.
(August 2, 1982).
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THE STRUCTURE OF CONTINGENT MARKETS
Economists have developed incentive-compatible devices that erect
disincentives for misstatement of personal valuations. 3 Unfortunately,
little scope exists for the use of these devices in cases where the goods
cannot be delivered and the various direct and side payments collected.
Thus, for valuation of many kinds of ambient environmental amenities,
a number of contingent valuation approaches have emerged that are seldom strictly incentive-compatible but, on the other hand, are not entirely
without incentives for accurate revelation.
Contingent valuation devices involve asking individuals, in survey or
experimental settings, to reveal their personal valuations of increments
(or decrements) in unpriced goods by using contingent markets. These
markets define the good or amenity of interest, the status quo level of
provision and the offered increment or decrement therein, the institutional
structure under which the good is to be provided, the method of payment,
and (implicitly or explicitly) the decision rule which determines whether
to implement the offered program. Contingent markets are highly structured, to confront respondents with a well-defined situation and to elicit
a circumstantial choice contingent upon the occurrence of the posited
situation. Contingent markets elicit contingent choices.
Extensive literature exists on the efficacy of stated attitudes, behavioral
intentions, etc., in predicting actual behavior, and the view emerges
therefrom that one should be quite cautious in using attitudes to predict
behavior. 14 In this literature, however, the term "attitude" appears to
cover responses to questions eliciting everything from broad affective
notions ("do you care about the environment?") to well-defined behavioral intentions. We reject the idea that negative or inconclusive results
with any kind of attitude-behavior pair reflect poorly on the credibility
of value data from contingent markets. Rather, we suspect that, for predicting behavior, some kinds of attitudinal information are much more
useful than others. Specifically we conjecture that, in terms of reliability
in predicting behavior, the following ranking of attitudinal information
from poorest to best pertains: affective attitudes, behavioral intentions,
and contingent choices.
Turning to the question of incentives in contingent markets, such markets are usually neither strictly incentive-compatible nor devoid of in13. Groves & Ledyard, OptimalAllocationof Public Goods:A Solution to the Free-RiderProblem,
45 ECONOMETRICA 783 (1977).
14. For two somewhat different interpretations of that literature, see Ajzen & Fishbein, AttitudeBehavior Relations: A Theoretical Perspective and Review of EmpiricalResearch, 84 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 888 (1977); and Schuman & Johnson, Attitudes and Behavior, 2 ANN. REV. SOC. 161
(1976).
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centives. Thus, experimental work, such as that reported by Vernon Smith,
is of interest. 15 In experimental public goods markets with relatively weak
incentives for accurate value revelation, Smith finds that most subjects
accurately report their personal (induced) valuations. A minority of antifree-riders counter-balances the minority of free-riders so that group mean
and aggregate bids are surprisingly accurate. 16 As Smith observes, if
everyone always acts strategically, it is hard to explain the prevalence of
flourishing churches. 17
Recent experiment findings may serve to tie together the "incentive
experiments" and "attitude-behavior" results. 8 Respondents faced with
two bets-one with the higher probability of winning (the P bet) and the
other with the larger maximum payoff (the M bet)--were asked first to
indicate which bet they would prefer and later to place money values on
the right to participate in each bet. In some cases, respondents would
first indicate a preference for one bet but then place a higher value on
the other: an apparent reversal of preferences. Two specific results are
interesting: (1) reversal was much more common among those who initially preferred the P bet than those preferring the M bet, and (2) when
the expected payoff of the M bet was larger than that for the P bet,
reversals among those who initially preferred the P bet were more than
twice as common as nonreversals. It seems that the contingent choice
question (the one asking money values for specific bets) elicited the
"right" answer more often than the more affective question (which do
you prefer?), reflecting a more complete decision process. This finding
supports the notion that some kinds of questions elicit more serviceable
responses than others, and among the various "attitudinal" questioning
devices, contingent choice questions seem to work best.
PERFORMANCE OF CONTINGENT VALUATION IN
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
From a small and quite recent beginning, 9 the body of reported contingent valuation studies has grown dramatically, and variants on the
15. V. L. Smith, Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Goods Decisions, 70
AM. ECON. REV. 584 (1980).
16. Nevertheless, there is a caveat. Smith (id.) found that as incentives for strategic behavior
became stronger and subjects became more familiar with the experimental format, the incidence of
strategic behavior increased somewhat.
17. Supra, note 15.
18. Grether & Plott, Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomena, 69
AM. ECON. REV. 623 (1979); and Pommerehne, Schneider and Zweifel, Economic Theory of
Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon: A Reexamination, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 569
(1982).
19. Davis, Recreation Planning as an Economic Problem, 3 NAT. RES. J. 239 (1963) and
Randall, Ives, & Eastman, Bidding Games for Valuation of Aesthetic Environmental Improvements,
1 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 132 (1974).
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original iterative bidding approach have proliferated. Several kinds of
evidence generated by these studies support contingent valuation methods.
First, contingent valuation bids are not random numbers. Many empirical studies show that individual or household bids are significantly
related to income, availability of substitute and complement goods, and
demographic characteristics. Basic data are disaggregate (usually, at the
individual or household level), cross-sectional in nature, and typically
generated from small samples. Considering the nature of this data, the
proportion of total variation in bid explained usually compares with that
in similar cross-sectional data sets.
Contingent valuation results are not only systematic, but are consistent
with various types of actual behavior. At the most elementary level,
individuals are willing to pay positive amounts in contingent markets for
amenities that (their behavior shows) they prefer. Tolley et al. found that
participation rates in a broad range of outdoor activities varied positively
with atmospheric visibility, while the number of television sets in use
related negatively to visibility. 20 Assuming, reasonably enough, that improved visibility expands opportunity sets in terms of visibility without
diminishing them in any other way, these behavioral changes unambiguously demonstrate that visibility is a commodity (i.e., more of it is
preferred to less). The same authors report significant positive valuations
for visibility increments expressed in contingent markets.
Where markets in related goods are adequate to permit demand-based
valuation of unpriced goods, 21 the possibility exists for direct comparison
of value estimates obtained with demand-based and contingent valuation
methods. In 1966, Knetsch and Davis22 reported consistent recreation site
values derived from contingent valuation and the travel cost method;
several subsequent studies repeated that result. Willingness to pay (WTP)
to preserve recreation site amenities was consistent, whether measured
by contingent valuation or a site substitution method.23 WTP for improved
air quality in metropolitan areas was consistent, whether measured by
contingent valuation or hedonic price analyses.24 WTP for infrastructure
and community facilities in a group of western energy boomtowns was
20. G. S. Tolley, A. Randall, G. Blomquist, R. Fabian, G. Fishelson, A. Frankel, J. P. Hoehn,
R. Krumm, and E. Mensah, Establishing and Valuing the Effects of Improved Visibility in Eastern
United States, Final Report 807768-01-0, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (in press).
21. See text accompanying notes 8, 9, and 10.
22. Knetsch & Davis, Comparisons of Methods for Recreation Evaluation, in WATER RE;EARCH (A. V. Kneese and S. C. Smith, eds., 1966).
23. Thayer, Contingent Valuation Techniques for Assessing Environmental Impact: Further Evifence, 8 J. ENVTL. ECON. MGMT. 27 (1981).
24. Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze, & d'Arge, Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of Survey and
fedonic Approaches, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 165 (1982), and E. Loehman, D. Boldt, and K. Chaikin,
4easuring the Benefits of Air Quality Improvements in the San Francisco Bay Area, final report,
;RI Project 8962 (1981).
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consistent, whether estimated by contingent valuation or a wage hedonic
analysis. 25 Recreation and related benefits of in-stream water quality improvements were consistent, whether measured by contingent valuation,
a contingent ranking method 26 or the travel cost method.2 7 WTP for goose
hunting permits in Wisconsin was broadly consistent, whether measured
by a contingent purchase method, travel cost, or cash transactions in an
experimental willingness-to-sell market. 28 Demand for visits to the Hancock Tower Observation Deck in Chicago and WTP for atmospheric
visibility improvements there compared closely, when measured by contingent valuation, by a time series analysis of visitation data, and by a
method relating visitations to the implicit price of visual range.29
The results of contingent valuation exercises and other benefit estimation methods are not merely mutually consistent. Where sound theoretical reasons exist to expect modest divergences among results of alternative
methods, the sign of the difference between contingent valuation results
and those of other methods is predictable from theoretical considerations.
Thus, Brookshire et al.30 predicted that the bid-rent function would overestimate WTP for air quality improvements, and found the estimates
derived by that method exceeded those from contingent valuation. We
argue (see the text accompanying note 40, infra) that one of the BishopHeberlein findings3 -that WTP estimated from a contingent purchase
method was lower than that derived from cash transactions in an experimental willingness-to-sell market-is predictable on the basis of theoretical considerations.
The performance of contingent valuation in empirical application might
be summarized as follows: while contingent valuation exercises have
generated some individual bids which do not appear to be serviceable,
virtually all competent contingent valuation studies have generated a
"solid core" of value information which performs well on the various
tests .32 Given the relatively weak incentives for careful decision making
25. R. E. Cummings, W. D. Schulze, S. Gerking, D. Brookshire, A Note on Measuring the
Elasticity of Wages for Municipal Infrastructure: A Comparison of Survey and Wage Hedonic Approaches (1982) (unpublished manuscript).
26. Rae, The Value to Visitors of Improving Visibility at Mesa Verde and Great Smokey Mountain
National Park in MANAGING AIR QUALITY AND SCENIC RESOURCES AT NATIONAL PARKS
AND WILDERNESS AREAS (R. D. Rowe and L. G. Chestnut, eds., 1982).
27. W. H. Desvouges, V. K. Smith, and M. D. McGivney, A Comparison of Alternative Ap.
proaches for Estimating Recreation and Related Benefits of Water Quality Improvements, report tc
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Econ. Analysis Division (1982).
28. Bishop & Heberlein, Measuring Values of Extra-Market Goods: Are Indirect Measures Biased?,
61 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 926 (1979).
29. Tolley, supra, note 20.
30. Supra, note 24.
31. Supra, note 28.
32. A. Randall, J. P. Hoehn, and G. S. Tolley, The Structure of Contingent Markets, presente(
to the annual meeting of the Am. Econ. Assoc. (Dec. 30, 1981).
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in contingent markets, and the possibility for strategic manipulation of
responses, the relatively strong performance of contingent valuation methods is perhaps surprising.
In spite of the generally encouraging performance of contingent valuation methods, some doubts remain. First, concerns about sampling bias
and enumerator bias arise from time to time. These concerns, however,
are best treated as problems common to all survey methods, and controllable with competent research design and management. Second, concern about strategic bias persists in some quarters, despite the paucity of
evidence that it actually occurs. Third, something called "hypothetical
bias" seems to be of greater concern, although the concept is not well
defined. The idea suggests that, because of weak penalties for inaccurate
value revelation, respondents may invest only a little time and effort in
decision making and, hence, their contingent choices may deviate more
than one would hope from the choices they would make in real markets.
The concept of hypothetical bias is so poorly defined that Feenburg and
Mills,33 for example, believe it is manifested in high noise levels, while
Bishop and Heberlein34 expect it to be expressed in systematic distortion
of mean bids downward for WTP and upward for WTA. Fourth, still
others3 5 have focused on "information bias" (and a subcategory thereof,
payment vehicle bias). With this focus, variations in the materials describing the contingent market may influence the contingent choices. Such
responses, however, may not evidence any kind of bias at all. If the
various elements of contingent market structure are relevant to the choice
problem, information that changes the structure of the market should
(arguably) change the circumstantial choices made therein. Economists
regard the responsiveness of prices to changes in market conditions as a
virtue. Surely, contingent values should be similarly responsive to changes
in contingent market conditions. Fifth, a repeated and persistent finding
by researchers is that estimates of WTP and WTA obtained with contingent
valuation diverge to a much greater degree than is predictable from the
theoretical analyses of Willig3 6 and Randall and Stoll.37
As the preceding paragraph suggests, observed anomalies and claimed
discrepancies in contingent valuation results are something of a mishmash. While not all the anomalies and discrepancies can be blithely
dismissed, neither should all be taken seriously. Some genuine anomalies
33. D. FEENBURG & E. S. MILLS, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF WATER POLLUTION
ABATEMENT (1980).
34. Supra, note 28.
35. Rowe, d'Arge & Brookshire, An Experiment on the Economic Value of Visibility, 7 J. ENVTL.
ECON. MGMT. 1 (1980); and Schulze, d'Arge & Brookshire, Valuing Environmental Commodities:
Some Recent Experiments, 57 LAND ECON. 151 (1981).
36. Willig, Consumer's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 587 (1976).
37. Supra, note 6.
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require explanation. Nevertheless, some claims of discrepancies reflect
problems with particular research designs and naive interpretation of
results, rather than inadequacies inherent in the contingent valuation method.
THE RESEARCH AGENDA
At the outset, the research agenda in contingent valuation sought to
establish, in the face of considerable skepticism, contingent valuation as
an acceptable method of non-market benefit estimation (acceptable in the
sense that it works about as well as available alternative techniques and
is adaptable to at least some valuation tasks that alternative methods
cannot handle). That objective has been attained. In addition, the experimental work of others38 has blunted traditional fears that strategic responses would inevitably dominate data sets of stated personal valuations.
These results have redefined the research agenda. Given the recent
proliferation of contingent market structures, and the sometimes conflicting interpretations of evidence that market design influences the result,
obtained, the current task is to identify and explain systematically the
relationship between the structure and performance of contingent markets.
In other words, the new research agenda seeks to explain why contingent
markets work as well as they do and to elucidate principles which may
lead to routine and effective use of contingent markets and to an understanding of their limitations.
BEHAVIOR IN CONTINGENT MARKETS
1. Predictionsfrom Theory
In research currently underway, Hoehn and Randall have made some
progress in conceptual modelling of the decision process of an individual
responding to contingent valuation exercises. 39 Here we introduce some
of their ideas at an intuitive level.
First, however, consider the goal of contingent valuation: the identification of potential Pareto-improvements. Define an optimal benefit cost
(BC) indicator as one that identifies all proposals which offer potential
Pareto-improvements as having positive net value, and all proposals which
do not offer potential Pareto-improvements as having negative net value.
Because the actual policy environment always seems characterized by
budget constraints and an excess of plausibly beneficial proposals, a
suboptimal but satisfactory BC indicator is defined as follows: one that
38. See text accompanying note 15.
39. Initial statements of this work are to be found in J. P. Hoehn, The Benefit-Cost Evaluation
of Multi-part Public Policy: A Theoretical Framework and Critique of Estimation Methods (1983,
unpublished dissertation); and J. P. Hoehn and A. Randall, Incentives and Performance in Contingent
Policy Valuation (February 12, 1983) (unpublished manuscript).
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identifies some of the proposals which offer potential Pareto-improvements as having positive net value, and all proposals which do not offer
potential Pareto-improvements as having negative net value.
With these definitions established, consider the factors that might influence bidding behavior of individuals who are motivated to truthfully
reveal their valuations. Later, strategic motivations are introduced.
(a) Bidding behavior of individualsmotivated to truthfully reveal their
valuations. First, assume that the decision process leading to stated bids
may be incomplete, as respondents limit the time (and, by extension,
other resources) they are willing to invest in solving contingent decision
problems. For the compensating measures of welfare change, the individual must solve the problem: minimize expenditures (PX) subject to
the constraint that initial utility is maintained (i.e., U = U°). Given that
only one solution, PX*, minimizes expenditures subject to this constraint,
an individual failing to identify PX* will settle for some other PX that
satisfies the constraint but exceeds PX*. This reduces the stated compensating value measures, i.e., reduces WTPc while increasing the absolute value of WTAc.
For the equivalent measures, the problem is to minimize PX subject
to U = U' (i.e., that utility is constrained to the subsequent level). The
decision problem is now two-fold: first, compute U' for the "with proposed policy" situation and then solve' for PX* subject to U = U'. An
individual failing to reallocate within the "with proposed policy" opportunity set so as to maximize utility will identify some other level of
utility lower than U' and thus underestimate the expenditure required to
satisfy U = U'. As before, imperfect solution of the expenditure minimizing problem results in some estimated expenditure greater than PX*.
The two effects are opposite in direction, leading to ambiguous results
for the equivalent measures: they may be under- or over-estimated.
There are several additional factors which may influence bidding behavior: individual risk aversion in the event of uncertainty as to how the
proposed amenity change will affect the opportunity set; randomly distributed individual biases in the perception of policy effectiveness, about
an unbiased population mean perception; and unfamiliarity with the concept and use of markets in traditionally unpriced amenities. All of these
considerations would tend to reduce WTP and increase WTA (where WTP
and WTA are population mean estimates of true WTP and WTA).
(b) Strategic Behavior. Assume individuals seek to transmit whatever
valuation information benefits themselves, regardless of its truth. The
40. Caution and reluctance in the use of unfamiliar markets applies to cash-transactions markets
as well as to contingent markets. For this reason, we argue that Bishop and Heberlein's (supra, note
28) WtA from a (institutionally unusual) cash-transactions market is likely overestimated, just as
their WTP from a contingent market is likely underestimated.
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individually-optimal bidding behavior depends on the perceived structure
of the contingent market. Three basic structures seem to cover most of
the important possibilities.
(i) Suppose each individual assumes his actual payment will be equal
to, or directly proportional to, his stated bid. Individuals who desire both
to have the policy implemented and to minimize their payments would
choose a strategy contingent upon what they assume about the behavior
of others. Those who assume the bids of others will be sufficient to ensure
implementation of the proposal may choose to free-ride and state a zero
bid. Those who assume their own positive bids will increase the chances
of implementation may state positive bids less than or equal to WTP. For
WTA one would for analogous reasons expect WTA <- stated bids <-c.
(ii) Suppose the respondent assumes that all will pay an amount equal
to per capita project cost, and the decision rule is to implement the project
if a majority responds favorably at that stated cost. Thus, the decision
criterion is perceived as a voting criterion. In this situation, an individual
cannot do better for himself than to "vote" YES at per capita cost no
higher than WTP and NO at higher per capita costs. Similarly, false
revelation of WTA for strategic reasons would be unproductive to the
individual.
Note that the iterative bidding routine involves repondents stating YES/
NO to costs or prices posited by the enumerator. Further, Randall and
his colleagues have often used formats of the type "if the proposed
program would cost you $X, would you approve or disapprove it? (accept
or reject, etc.)."
(iii) Suppose the respondent assumes that all will pay the per capita
project cost, and the public decision rule is to implement the project if
the sum of stated bids exceeds the total project cost. This situation is
difficult to analyze. The simplest case (and, incidentally, the one considered by Brookshire, Ives, and Schulze 41 assumes, inter alia, that each
individual thinks everyone but himself is bidding truthfully, and each
individual has some information about the distribution of preferences
across individuals. Under these assumptions, those who suspect their true
bids deviate from the mean would report bids exaggerating the deviation,
so as to influence the mean toward their true bid. Clearly, such behavior
increases the variance of stated bids. For commodities, because WTP
bids can be no less than zero but have no well-defined upper limit, the
mean bid might be biased upward. Statistical techniques for correcting
this bias exist, however. Because the sample of bids is censored at zero,
those methods which estimate the means of uncensored distributions from
41. Brookshire, Ives, & Schulze, The Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON.
MGMT. 325 (1976).
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the information contained in the censored distribution are applicable. 42
Hence, this kind of strategic behavior is unlikely, given appropriate statistical analysis of bids, to mislead the researcher as to mean WTP.
(iv) In summary, examination of selfish strategies reveals little scope
of strategic behavior which would lead to mean stated VTP bids (corrected, in case iii) exceeding mean WTP, or mean stated WTA bids less
than WTA.
(c) The net effect of non-strategic and strategic influences. For compensating value measures, consideration of the predictable effects of incomplete optimization, imperfect knowledge, unfamiliar markets, and
strategic false revelation leads to an unambiguous result: contingent markets can be expected to yield bids in the ranges 0 < stated WTPc -- WTPc
and WTAc -< stated WTAc _<oo. Using compensating value measures,
benefits are measured as WTPc and costs as WTAc. Therefore, we conclude (on theoretical grounds): Contingent valuation, in a compensating
value framework, provides a satisfactory BC indicator.
No such claim can be made for contingent valuation in an equivalent
value framework for two reasons: first, with perfect measures of WTPE
and WTAE, the equivalent framework nevertheless identifies some changes
which are not potential Pareto-improvements as having positive net benefits;43 and second, there is no unambiguous prediction of the effects of
the influences discussed in part (a), above, on the signs of any deviations
between stated and true WTPE and WTAE.
44
(d) Aggregate benefits of complex policy packages. Hoehn and Randall
report the following theoretical findings, which have implications for
empirical work. The benefits of a complex policy package (B) are, in
general, not equal to the sum of the independently estimated benefits
(Y-Bi) of its components. While B conceivably could exceed 7XBi in special
cases, XBi is more likely to overstate B. Consider the sequential implementation of policy components. For some particular policy component
(i), its benefits (Bi) are typically smaller the later it occurs in the implementation sequence.
2. EmpiricalEvidence
The above conjectures, based on traditional economic-theoretical analyses, may contain the seeds of many fruitful hypotheses concerning the
performance of contingent markets. Consideration of the psychological
42. Tobin, Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables, 26 ECONOMETRICA
24 (1958), Amemiya, Regression Analysis When the Dependent Variable is Truncated Normal, 41
ECONOMETRICA 997 (1973), and Olsen, A Least Squares Correctionfor Selectivity Bias, 48
ECONOMETRICA 1815 (1980).
43. Randall and Stoll, supra, note 6.
44. Supra, note 12.
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processes in which individuals clarify their objectives ("research their
preferences '45 ) and make contingent choices suggests a further source of
hypotheses.
The present authors have barely scratched the surface. To make a small
beginning, consider the following hypotheses:
a. Reported WTAc will exceed reported WTPE by an amount equal to
or greater than that suggested by the pure theory of economic surplus .46
This hypothesis emerges from considerations developed above and corroborated repeatedly in the empirical literature.
b. Considering that uncertainty, unfamiliarity with the market, and
limited investment in making contingent decisions are among the reasons
we predict 0s< reported WTPc -<WTP, anything which facilitates use of
the contingent market will tend to stabilize and increase reported WTPc.
Additional useful information and devices that encourage the respondent
to take more time to research his/her preferences, iterate toward a decision
and/or decompose the bidding decision into a series of more manageable
steps, would have this predicted effect.
c. Reported WTpC.for more precisely defined policy proposals more
nearly approaches WTPc and is more stable in the face of influences,
such as those considered in b, immediately above.
d. Reported WTPc obtained with iterative YES/NO bidding devices
will exceed that obtained with checklists, one-shot contingent purchase
questions, or questions directly asking "maximum WTP?".
e. Reported WTPc for a single policy component introduced alone
exceeds that for the same component valued as the last part of a sequentially-introduced package of policies.
A set of hypotheses concerning reported WTAc, analogous to b through
d but with predicted influences of opposite sign, can also be derived from
theoretical considerations. Unambiguous predictions concerning reported
WTPE are considerably more elusive.
Randall et al.47 (henceforth RHT), Brookshire et al.48 (BCRST), and
Sorg and Brookshire 49 (SB) conducted case studies permitting initial tests
of hypotheses b through e.
Hypothesis b. BCRST introduced explicit considerations of the re45. D. S. Brookshire, R. G. Cummings, M. Rahmatian, W. D. Schulze, and M. Thayer, Experimental Approaches for Valuing Environmental Commodities, draft final report for Methods
Development in Measuring Benefits of Environmental Improvements, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Grant #CR 808-893-01 (1982).
46. Randall and Stoll, supra, note 6.
47. Supra, note 32.
48. Supra, note 45.
49. C. Sorg and D. S. Brookshire, Valuing Increments and Decrements of Wildlife ResourcesFurtherEvidence, report to the U.S. Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment
Station (1982).
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CONTINGENT VALUATION SURVEYS

spondent's budget constraint into contingent markets in several non-market goods. Following a traditional contingent valuation exercise, respondents
reported their budget constraints and pre-bid budget allocations among
categories of goods, made post-bid budget reallocations to "figure out
where the money would come from," and stated a final bid.
In all cases but one, the introduction of the budget constraint and
reallocation procedure increasedthe mean reported WTP, but the increase
was not significant in every case. 50
Hypothesis c. For a well-defined, local improvement in ambient air
quality (BCRST) and an increment in elk herds (SB), the budget constraint
and reallocation procedure has insignificant effect on reported WTPc. For
a loosely-defined national policy to improve water quality in lakes and
streams (BCRST), however, this procedure led to a significant increase
in reported WTPc. This provides evidence that reported WTPc for welldefined goods is more stable than that for loosely-defined policies.
Hypothesis d. Researchers reporting tests of iterative bidding routines
versus contingent markets using checklists found that iterative bidding
routines increase reported WTPc. In one case (BCRST), the evidence for
this effect was weak, but in two others (RHT and SB) it was strong.
Hypothesis e. BCRST and RHT experimented with the sequential introduction of policy components. In every case, the prior introduction of
additional components reduced reported WTPc for the component of interest. In a few of the cases studies by BCRST, this effect was insignificant; otherwise, significant and quite substantial effects were found by
BCRST and RHT. Even in the case of the hazardous waste policy, which
had generated a controversial result with respect to hypothesis b, 5 ' the
prior introduction of other policy components reduced reported bids
(BCRST).
Comment. Those results cannot claim the status of empirical laws. At
best, they are tentative and subject to future attempts at corroboration or
disconfirmation. We present them at this time because we believe that,
along with the conceptual work in the preceding section, they suggest
the possibility of a fruitful research agenda concerning the structure of
contingent markets.
50. Among the present authors, Brookshire (who is inclined toward the hypothesis that this kind
of step-wise decomposition of the contingent choice problem would stabilize reported bids) is
untroubled by this result. Randall and Hoehn (who expect the process to stabilize reported WTPc
c
and drive it upward toward WTP ) are troubled by the one case in which the budget constraint
procedure reduced reported bids. They note that this case involved a proposed policy (of uncertain
effectiveness) to contain hazardous wastes. Since the reference situation was one in which the problem
would grow worse in the absence of the policy, one reasonable interpretation of this contingent
.
market is that it generates estimates of WTPE, not WTP1
51. Id, and accompanying text.
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CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Our purpose has been to establish that empirical contingent valuation
research is moving into a new phase. In its first phase, the objective was
to show, in the face of considerable skepticism, that contingent valuation
"worked" in the sense that (1) it got results and (2) those results were
consistent with theory-based expectations and the empirical findings obtained with other techniques. That objective, we believe, has been attained. In so doing, a considerable body of empirical data accumulated,
much of it vaguely suggestive of some underlying principles which may
govern human behavior in contingent markets.
The next phase, we argue, is a systematic conceptual and empirical
exploration of the various influences on the performance of contingent
markets. This phase should include rigorous theoretical analyses based
on modern microeconomic theory (to elucidate the incentives and costs
facing contingent valuation respondents), socio-psychological research
into the decision-making process (to evaluate the relevance of concepts
such as "preference research" '5 2 and "mental accounts," 5 3 and careful
empirical experimentation to test hypotheses rigorously derived from solid
conceptual foundations. This research program, if successful, will permit
much more insightful interpretation of contingent valuation results, an
appreciation of the limits of the technique and, perhaps, the routine design
of effective contingent markets for evaluation of a wide variety of proposed projects, programs and policies.

52. See Brookshire, supra, note 45.
53. See Kahneman and Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, 246 SC. AM. 160 (1982).

